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those of the nation-state as the nation-state clawed its way to dominate the international 
community. Nation-states achieved their pre-eminence and dominance of the international 
community on the backs of free enterprise and capitalism; and now this dependence threatens 
their very existence. Now belatedly nation-states are attempting to regulate the global 
economy through the IMF and the World Bank and other means. This paper examines the 
effect that the global economy has upon the traditional understanding of sovereignty. 
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For over 300 years, Nation-States have been the most important political units in the 
international system.1 Moreover Nation-States have claimed that their authority, their national 
sovereignty, was a legal monopoly of power to be exercised within their geographic domain, 
free from interference from external actors. Put simply their sovereignty was “absolute”, an 
assertion that Nation-States vigorously defended particularly regarding their right to 
legislative competence. The origins of national sovereignty can be traced as far back as the 
period of the Roman Empire, where the Roman Emperor was considered absolute simply 
because Rome had either through conquest or other means consumed most if not all other 
forms of political communities in Europe.2
In the 16th century, Jean Bodin, a French political thinker offered the first systematic approach 
to national sovereignty. 3 In his famous work, ‘Six Books of the Commonwealth’, in 1576, he 
defined sovereignty as follows: ‘Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a 
Commonwealth,..’4 and further ‘For he is absolutely sovereign who recognises nothing, after 
God, that is greater than himself’5 and that the word sovereignty meant ‘the most high, 
absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a commonwealth.’6 Bodin’s 
emphasis on ‘absoluteness’ is clear. Its importance was that it determined who was the 
 
1 See FRANCIS H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 2 (2d ed. 1986): ‘In a word, the origin and history of the concept of 
sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of the state.’ Hinsley believed that the 
development of sovereignty required the development of the Nation-State.  
2 M Olivier, Aspects of the Establishment of Sovereignty and the Transfer of Government Authority 14 SOUTH 
AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988-1989) 85.  
3 Jarat Chopra, The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law, in, SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE, 41 & 56 (M. Heiberg eds, 1994). 
4 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1 (Julian 
Franklin ed & trans. 1992). 
5 Id. at 4. 
3sovereign and therefore absoluteness was the defining element of sovereignty. He also 
described sovereignty to have two sides to it, external and internal.7
The international community was configured and is still based on the notion of supposedly 
equal absolute sovereigns, therefore creating a dichotomy of absolute power domestically 
within the Nation-State and limited power beyond the Nation-States’ borders aimed at 
ensuring non-interference by one sovereign in the affairs of another.8 Thus what Nation-States 
mean and what they desire to protect most of all, when they refer to absolute sovereignty, is 
primarily that within the context of their borders their government has; ‘the competence to 
organise the Nation-State’s domestic management at its own discretion...’9 In other words 
freedom from external forces; political independence. 
Relating the notion of freedom from external interference to contemporary developments in 
the global economy, multiple trading conglomerates who are not limited by national borders 
(indeed do not owe any national allegiance) have combined with technical innovations in 
communications to forge forces (especially economic) that now seriously challenge the so-
called “absolute” authority of many Nation-States. This phenomenon called here 
“globalisation” seems not only to ignore national sovereignty but appears to be immune to the 
actions of Nation-States and their attempts at regulation. Globalisation therefore poses the 
greatest threat to national sovereignty in the history of the Nation-State, since it threatens the 
very core of national sovereignty; the ability of Nation-States to remain independent.
6 GRIFFITHS ET AL., INTRODUCING THE LAW, 38 (4th ed. 1993). 
7 Initially sovereignty implied just the powers of the feudal lord (prince) however with the emergence of 
‘Nation-States’ in the 16th and 17th centuries, it now included the external element. INGRID DETTER DE LUPIS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE 3 (1974). 
8 This has led to the development of a split legal persona, that is domestic or internal sovereignty and 
international or external sovereignty. Throughout this thesis the term domestic or inward or internal refers to the 
exercise of sovereignty within a nation-state’s own territory and external, outward or inter -Nation-State refers to 
the exercise of sovereignty beyond the nation-state’s borders.  
4Globalisation has both positive and negative aspects. The negative perceptions of 
globalisation are embedded in the response of Nation-States to the perceived threat of losing 
their identity. The issue that the Article deals with is globalisation as a construct of the 
Nation-State and seeks to address whether globalisation (specifically in the economic sphere), 
has outgrown the Nation-State and now enslaves national sovereignty to foreign economic 
interests and thus a gradual disappearance of the Nation-State bit by bit under economic 
globalisation especially considering that globalisation of the economy relies upon large 
amounts of money and capital moving across political boundaries and affects foreign 
exchange, interest rates, stock market investment levels, employment levels and government 
tax revenues. 
 
Part II of the Article introduces the genesis of the globalisation threat which incidentally had 
its roots in the imperialistic and hegemonic agendas of European States. The frequent 
occurrence of war and changing nature of warfare in the early days of the modern Nation-
State—standing professional armies and new warfare technology—dictated a need to devote a 
great deal of financial resources to military expenditure. Imperialistic success was hinged on 
military and economic resources—the ability to guarantee control of new territory against 
other challengers as well as the capacity to meet the opportunities and challenges that new, 
expanding markets offered. It would appear that the Nation-State initially keen to develop a 
global platform for its nationalistic agendas through use of both public and private finance, 
was in the end caught “off–guard” with the emergence of fully-fledged transnational 
corporations in the 20th century. Part III of the Article moves the discussion from the 
postulations laid down in Part II to the contemporary ramifications on the global stage that 
technological change, increasing production, greater consumption and rising world trade and 
 
9 Olivier, supra note 2, at 94. This includes such things as the capacity to formulate a constitution, to make laws 
that affect the population of that particular ‘real estate’. 
5financial flows wrought. It discusses globalisation generally with a bias to its economic 
dimension. In Part IV the Article discusses the global governance and regulatory regimes 
cultivated by the global forces which have had the cumulative effect of increasing the power 
and influence of multilateral institutions at the expense of the Nation-State’s ability to 
maintain its traditional economic aristocracy due to increasing needs for State accountability 
and responsibility in an ever-increasing global environment. It should be noted that 
globalisation is not a unitary process but affects each nation differently, with variances 
stemming from a number of factors, including size, wealth and power. 
 
II. The Emergence of the Nation-State and the Origins of Globalisation. 
The development of national sovereignty and the development of a global community 
comprised of Nation-States are so closely linked that answering the question of which enabled 
the other to develop is unclear.10 Regardless of the answer to that question, the origins of both 
lie in Western Europe, in the Roman Empire and the authority of the Emperor.11 The collapse 
of the Roman Empire created a power vacuum in which the modern Nation-State and its 
obsession with sovereignty as a mantle to ward off external pressure and cement its internal 
authority then began a process of evolution with that enabled, assisted or even forced the 
modern concept of national sovereignty to develop.12 The fact that not one of the emerging 
political communities in Europe could assert their dominance over all other rivals, despite 
obvious efforts, resulted in almost a constant state of warfare, “hot or cold”, for most of these 
 
10 Determining this question is similar to resolving the age-old question of which came first; the chicken or the 
egg. However, in a sense the answer is neither the chicken or the egg. Hinsley, supra note 1, at 2: ‘In a word, the 
origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of 
the state.’ See supra note 1. 
11 Olivier, supra note 2 at 85; Hinsley, supra note 1, at 222-223See Bleimaier, The Future of Sovereignty in the 
21st Century, [1993] 6 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L 17 . Whilst Bleimaier believed that sovereignty preceded the nation-
state, he still ascribed the origins of sovereignty to the Roman Empire.See p.16. 
12 See Hinsley, supra note 1, 73, 101 & 124-126;PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS,
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500-2000, 24, (1989); BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE 
RISE OF THE STATE, THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICS, 25 (1994). 
6communities, often against multiple enemies.13 The role of virtual continual warfare in the 
development of the body politic into an executive was crucial.14 As the political communities 
expanded, so did the need for centralised government.15 The rise of strong centralised 
governments was a direct result of frequent warfare which created a self-perpetuating cycle of 
war, expansion and war again.16 Frequent internal as well as external conflicts necessitated 
the need for emerging central authority to assert itself decisively both within and without so 
as to overcome other competing political authorities.17 This was also an important reason 
why early theorists such as Bodin declared sovereignty to be absolute. However there was an 
even more important effect of this constant state of warfare and quest for dominance within 
Europe by the emerging political communities: it created the concept of a market economy 
and “western” capitalism.   
 
The introduction of gunpowder And the subsequent development of new weapons radically 
changed the nature of warfare, the types of armies and tactics used by any political leader or 
community. But more significantly it changed irrevocably the cost of warfare, increasing it to 
the point that it bankrupted many emerging European communities.18 The fact that no single 
community could obtain ascendancy created an environment that demanded constant 
innovation, experimentation with tactics, weapons and military theories, but also 
 
13 KENNEDY, supra note 12, Chapter 2, particularly at 39-94.  
14 For an excellent discussion of the role of warfare in the development of the nation-state, see generally PORTER 
supra note 12 at 28. The author advocates a five-step process by which war provided the necessary stimulus for 
the creation. 
15 HINSLEY, supra note 1, at 32. Hinsley believed that the development of sovereignty required expansion of the 
community beyond a certain size. This then created the need for an executive administration separate from the 
community. See 30-36 & 32 where he states that the creation of the Empire created ‘the beginnings of an 
association between the government and the community...’. Hinsley therefore, when referring to the body politic, 
is referring to the development of the executive. See below. 
16 PORTER, supra note12, at 58.  
17 Such as smaller feudal lords. Id., at 29-31. 
18 Such as France and Spain in 1557; Spain again in 1607. See Kennedy’s discussion of this point in the author’s 
Chapter 3. KENNEDY supra note 12, at 89-111.  
7experimentation with finances and developing new and more efficient means of raising and 
collecting the necessary revenue for continuing their struggles.1920 
As imperialistic agendas stretched public resources, European leaders became 
increasingly dependent upon private finance to plug the gap between State ambition 
and available public funds. States thus sought to create an environment that 
encouraged the development of merchants and bankers.  Bankers, arms dealers and 
artisans became essential, not peripheral members of society..21 
Commenting on the ‘Financial revolution’ of this era that gave birth to western capitalism, 
Kennedy observes that:  
 
Gradually, unevenly, most of the regimes of Europe entered into a symbiotic 
relationship with the market economy, providing for it domestic order and a non-
arbitrary legal system (even for foreigners), and receiving in taxes a share of the 
growing profits from trade.22 
The significance of a market economy was its dynamic nature; once it had been “created” 
society was changed irrevocably.23 Alongside its dynamic nature, economic growth occurs, 
because of another inherent characteristic, namely that it is/was a Darwinian style-system that 
encouraged the survival of the fittest; non-profitable organisations do not survive unless there 
is intervention into the market by national governments. Thus there is an adjustment of the 
use of land, a reallocation of resources, capital, and labour to those who were most efficient 
and profitable; a cycle that builds upon itself, since the increased resources results in greater 
profits, which in turn encouraged more resources to be “reallocated” to that entity.  24 
19 Id at 100-109.  
20 This enabled Britain to have the ‘decisive margin’ in men and ships at crucial moments. See Id,at 100-109. 
21 Id., at 24 
22 Id., Kennedy describes this as the “Financial Revolution”. 
23 A fact realised by writers such as Marx. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, 19 (1987). 
24 Id.,at 18-20. 
8As Nation-States in Europe were born, so too was globalisation, as the Nation-States’ 
relationship with the market economy and capitalism in Western Europe gradually became a 
dependency;25 and so Nation-States, in their use of capitalism in their quest to affirm their 
very existence sowed the seeds of a phenomenon that was later to chisel away at the very 
foundation of their authority, their national sovereignty. At the early stage of the emergence 
of Nation-States, very few could predict that corporations would become so powerful, or that 
one day Nation-States would lose control not only of the global economy but much of their 
own national economies. After all international trade, that is the shipment of goods from one 
political territory to be sold or traded in the territory of another, was as old as Nation-States 
themselves and rather then be a threat was perceived as a benefit.26 
The advent of the 20th century and the technological advancements (especially in 
telecommunications) that dominated the era marked a turning point for global trade. 
Technological breakthroughs liberated transnational corporations from their previous 
dependence on State controlled networks and patronage. So successful have transnational 
corporations been in harnessing the advantages offered by technology and the opportunities 
created by global trade that by the end of the 20th century, half of the top 100 economies in the 
world were not Nation-States but corporations.27 International trade and corporations had 
evolved far beyond the simple nature of a national firm trading in a foreign market.28 Multi-
national corporations [or MNC’s] as these new corporations became known, duplicated their 
activities, i.e. retailing the same products and their organisations in different Nation-States 
and taking advantage off lower labour costs and more liberal national environmental laws to 
 
25 Gilpin describes it in this manner: ‘The economic well-being of peoples and the fate of nations have become 
intimately joined to the functioning and consequences of the market.’ Id.,at 5. 
26 Howe Martyn,, Development of the Multinational Corporation in ABDUL. A. SAID & LIUZ R. SIMMONS, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS SOVEREIGN POWERS, at 30-44, in particular p. 31, 
(Abdul. A. Said & Liuz R. Simmons, ed.s, 1975). 
27 CLIVE PONTING, PROGRESS AND BARBARISM, THE WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 99, (1998)  
28 Id., at 110. 
9move parts of their “manufacturing/production” process to other Nation-States. As Ponting 
notes: ‘… by the 1980’s a third of all world trade took place as transactions within 
transnational corporations.’29 
What this did was to open up States to foreign corporations which simply relocated or set up 
part of their operations enabling them to tap the resources contained therein, an important 
strategy in fuelling globalisation. The rapid expansion of MNC’s and corporations in the 20th 
century and their heavy involvement in international trade especially after the Second World 
War was accelerated by two main factors. Firstly, the initial immaturity of technology; which 
limited their ability to access new markets and thus ensured the economic ascendancy of 
Nation-States over trading collectivities, with their large pool of personnel and resources, was 
swept aside by technological breakthroughs. Though domestic markets, particularly those the 
size of the US had initially satisfied the needs of corporations, telecommunication and 
transport advancements dramatically threw open the globe by pushing down costs and 
facilitating secure and instantaneous forms of communication. Once dramatic improvements 
had been made in transport and communications, and importantly in the ability to market their 
products, corporations quickly outgrew their national borders.30 
Secondly, unlike Nation-States who were responsible for all of their citizens, corporations 
were concerned for their shareholders only. Nation-States, particularly after their experience 
in the Great Depression of the 1920’s sought full employment and low inflation for all their 
citizens.31 Nation-States had to govern for all elements of their communities and so often had 
 
29 Id.,at 101. 
30 Air travel made an important difference, since important officials and managers no longer had to spend 
months wasted at sea. See Martyn, supra note 26, at 37. Secondly, the improvement in transport reduced the cost 
of transport, thus goods could be sold in new markets more cheaply, or at least at a similar cost to the domestic 
market -and thus become more available to developing markets.   
31 GEORGE KENWOOD & A.L. LOUGHEED, THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 1820-2000, 338 
(George Kenwood & A.L. Lougheed eds,4th ed. 1999), at 336. 
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to shift resources from successful provinces to a less profitable one.32 The governing bodies 
of corporations’ had a much narrower focus than national governments; the sole purpose of 
corporations was to generate profit, allowing them to more easily concentrate their energies to 
realise this goal. MNCs developed an efficiency that the Nation-State would not match as the 
‘middle-man’ in international trade thus beginning the process of displacing the Nation-State 
and its role. Conflict between Nation-States and corporations often occurred as their goals 
were diametrically opposed to one another. Summing this up Gilpin observes: 
 
Whereas powerful market forces in the form of trade, money, and foreign investment 
tend to jump national boundaries, to escape political control [by Nation-States] and to 
integrate societies, the tendency of government is to restrict, to channel, and to make 
economic activities serve the perceived interests of the State and of powerful groups 
within it.33 
As a consequence of their own policies designed to further the golden goal of vibrant, 
dynamic economic growth, Nation-States lost ‘control’ (Did they ever have control?) of 
corporations for the simple reason it was inevitable that corporations would outgrow their 
national borders or indeed any political border.34 The very nature of corporations (which 
Nation-States sought to use for their own benefit) their dynamic, innovative competitiveness, 
would always push corporations to expand and therefore to seek out new markets. After all a 
market means greater sales and greater sales meant greater profits, the raison d’etat of
corporations.  
 
This part of the Article as carried out a tour de horizon of the genesis of the global 
phenomenon and the role of the State as midwife in the process. The discussion as sailed into 
the 20th century, which marked the maturation of global trade. Although this is a rather simple 
 
32 See KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF NATION-STATES, THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES, 41-59, (1996) & 
KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD, POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY, (1990). 
33 GILPIN, supra  note 23, at 11. 
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explanation of the history of the growth of the international economy over two centuries, and 
doesn’t include many factors such as the role of oil prices, the discussion aims to make one 
point clear; Nation-States realising that corporations and the market economy would assist 
them in the struggle for survival in the international community created an environment 
conducive for corporations to develop. This cooperation with corporations allowed Nation-
States to flourish but also led to the development of MNC’s: entities that not only owed no 
allegiance to Nation-States, but were now beyond their control. So in a reversal of roles, 
Nation-States now sought to cooperate with one another to regulate the threat posed by 
corporations.  
 
The next issue is: how has the Nation-States sovereignty fared in the swirl of global economic 
contemporary forces that it helped create? The next part of the Article will give an overview 
of globalisation vis-à-vis sovereignty. It will raise the issues of the redefinition of the Nation-
State identity, the reshaping of the fixed and firm Westphalian boundaries between the 
national and international spheres and the fracturing of the statist centred monistic order. 
Globalisation of the world economy with its quest for international integration arguably 
provides one of the tools for the chiselling away of sovereignty by decentralising national 
economies and wrestling control from the State. 
 
III. The Globalisation Challenge to Sovereignty 
As Dunne notes, “[l]ike most concepts in politics and international relations, the meaning of 
globalisation is contested. This is the principal reason why it is necessary to bring 
philosophical and sociological insights to bear on the study of globalisation. Since 
globalisation is not apparent to our sensory experiences--though of course we may be able to 
 
34 Do corporations really owe any allegiance to the country of their origin? Their desire for profits would suggest 
a negative answer to that question. 
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observe some of its effects--we need theoretical tools to guide us in framing the appropriate 
kinds of questions to ask.”35 One of the more widely used working definitions is Anthony 
Giddens’s suggestion that globalisation represents “the intensification of worldwide social 
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa.”36 But beneath this accessible description lie 
many layers of complexity. Globalisation is not an economic or a socio- political process, it is 
both. Globalisation is a set of “intersecting processes,” with limits and trends. Globalisation “. 
. . represents the perception of the world as an interconnected whole and the consciousness 
that a number of issues can no longer be addressed purely at a local level.”37 Globalisation 
involves the development of transnational processes, for example labour or cross-border 
labour mobility and the world market with the cross-border transfer of goods, services and 
capital, and exists as a developing continuum.38 In essence, globalisation is the 
deterritorialisation of culture,39 and the formation of a total and integrated economic system, 
stimulating political interaction between States and promoting the cultural diversity of 
identity.40 Globalisation strains the ideals so that people redefine groups based on culture, 
religion, moral and political values, instead of defining groups based on the division of 
borders.41 
Globalisation raises many troubling questions with regard to the Nation-State, the traditional 
primary player in the international arena. Among these concerns ‘… are perceived fears that 
 
35 Tim Dunne, Symposium on Globalization at the Margins: Perspectives on Globalization from 
Developing States: The Spectre Of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 17, 20 (1999). 
36 Anthony Giddens, quoted in Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 14, 15 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997). 
37 NIKOS PAPASTERGIADIS, THE TURBULENCE OF MIGRATION 77 (2000). 
38 Id., at 85, see also RONALD M. BOSROCK, COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION; FROM OLYMPIAN IDEALS TO 
NATIONALIST ISOLATION, GLOBALIZATION TAPS THE SPECTRUM OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
EMOTIONS, Star Trib. (MN), Sept. 25, 2000 at 3D. 
39 See PAPASTERGIADIS, supra  note 37, at 76 
40 Id., at 77. 
41 Id., at 87 
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globalisation eradicates the identity of the Nation-State, imposes Western ideals on non-
Western nations, exploits weak Nation-States to the benefit of powerful, rich nations in 
essence taking from the poor to feed the rich, dilutes national management, control and 
politics in favour of international integration, and imposes an international legal process 
(some may say democracy) upon individual nations through political influence and pressure, 
resulting in the destruction of national culture.’42 Not surprising, sovereignty seeks to target 
globalisation as the primary figure in the annihilation of national identity. Globalisation seems 
to be a force that works with both common and competing interests towards the achievement 
of a “minimum world order.”43 By targeting the economic sphere and steadily loosening 
national governments’ economic aristocracy, globalisation has as its goal a restriction of 
governmental interference and elimination of trade and financial protectionism which is 
antagonistic to globalisation. Addressing the decline of the Nation-State’s economic 
aristocracy, Sassen explains that: 
 
States today confront a new geography of power. The associated changes in the 
condition of the State are often described as an overall decline in the State’s 
significance, especially the decline in its regulatory capacities. Economic 
globalisation, for one, has brought with it strong pressures for the deregulation of a 
broad range of markets, economic sectors and national borders, and for the 
privatisation of public sector firms and operations.44 
Globalisation is reshaping the fixed and firm boundary between domestic and international 
spheres and changing our conceptions of the proper domain of domestic and international 
politics and law. In reformulating the entrenched disciplinary assumptions underlying the 
conceptual definitions of the national and the international, we necessarily move the concept 
 
42 Danielle S Petito, Sovereignty and Globalization; Fallacies, Truth and Perception, N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
1139, 1143 (2001). 
43 See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW; A POLICY ORIENTED 
PERSPECTIVE 411 (2d ed. 2000); Professor Lung-Chu Chen, Class Lecture (Nov. 29, 2000). 
44 Saskia Sassen, What’s Wrong with International Law Scholarships The State And Economic Globalization: 
Any Implications For International Law? 109 CHI. J. INT’L L., 1 (2000). 
14
of sovereignty to the foreground. There is no doubt that the process of globalisation is 
transforming traditional conceptions and constructions of sovereignty; the conventional image 
of Westphalian sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction is no longer 
theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face of the internationalisation of economic and 
social activity.45 
The concept of the sovereign State as an entity that has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory 
(with the concomitant limitation on external encroachment on its power), as well as the notion 
of an internal sovereignty reflected in the internal unity of the State and its “monistic” legal 
order, is under transformation. As Jayasuriya observes, ‘[t]he notion of a single unified 
system of internal sovereignty has become increasingly problematic in a global political 
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decision-
making authority.’46 With the globalisation of economic relations, there is a growing 
incongruity between a territorial notion of sovereignty and the flow of economic activity 
which disrupts the internal unity or coherence of the State.47 Increasingly, various agencies 
and institutions within the State develop a high degree of autonomy and independence; this 
fragmentation of the domestic order of the State is central to the development of international 
forms of regulatory governance.  
 
It is apparent that the increasing complexity of globalisation brings with it a global system of 
governance and regulation. The regulatory forms have two main features. First, they are 
governed by both networks of State agencies as well as multilateral institutions acting not on 
behalf of the State but as independent actors. Second, the emergent international regulatory 
 
45 Kanishka Jayasuriya ,Globalisation, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global 
Regulatory Governance (1999) IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 425, (1999). 
46 Id., at 426. 
47 Id., at 438. 
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order is concerned with laying down standards and general regulatory principles. 
Developments in both global governance and international regulation suggest the emergence 
of a system of decentralised enforcement or the regulation of self-regulation in which the 
Nation-State does not necessarily have the upperhand. This Article in addressing the 
globalisation challenge to sovereignty will in the next part focus on global governance and 
regulation of the economy and the necessary requirement of the internationalisation of State 
agencies and institutions. While this two aspects go hand in hand, the Article seeks to discuss 
them in two different sections so as to highlight two distinct factors, firstly the power and 
influence of the IMF and the World Bank through its linkage of conditions to loans 
disbursement as a means of cultivating sound economic policies especially in emerging 
economies. Secondly, the fragmentation of the State, a form that sovereignty takes in an 
increasingly global economy and an overview of the WTO’s role in laying down a rule based 
international framework which arguably is intrusive upon certain traditional spheres of the 
State’s law-making competence and freedom of action. 
 
IV. Global Governance and Regulation 
4.1. Multilateral Institutional Order and Global Goverance 
Central to the global economy is the disjunction between the territorial nature of sovereignty 
and the increasing global nature of economic flows. In short, the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Modern State over economic life is increasingly constrained by the globalisation of economic 
and social relations.48 Susan Strange, in a sophisticated analysis of these changes in the global 
political economy,49 provides a two-fold argument: one, that all States--small and weak--have 
had their authority and functions greatly diminished because of the integration of States into 
 
48 Id., at 433-434 
49 See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (1996) (analyzing the circumstances and conditions that have contributed to the decline of the 
Westphalian model). 
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the global economy; and, two, that “some of the fundamental responsibilities of the State in a 
market economy--responsibilities first recognised, described, and discussed at considerable 
length by Adam Smith over 200 years ago--are not now being adequately discharged by 
anyone.”50 
The emergence of a mostly private international institutional order wherein the strategic 
agents are not the national governments of leading countries, but a variety of private actors, 
may well have the effect of reducing the scope and exclusivity of the State’s authority and 
law-making competence. In Sassen’s words, “…this new institutional order also has 
normative authority--a new normativity that is not embedded in what has been (and to some 
extent remains) the master normativity of modern times, raison d’etat.”51. In Sassen’s view, 
‘economic globalisation, has emerged as a key dynamic in the formation of a transnational 
system of power which lies in good part outside the formal interstate system;52 Despite the 
role the State retains in regulation of the economy (mainly the national economy), we are 
seeing a repositioning of the State in a broader field of power and with global forces 
reconfiguring the work of States. This broader field of power is partly constituted through the 
formation of a new private institutional order linked to the global economy, but also through 
the growing importance of a variety of other institutional orders, from the new roles of the 
international network of multilateral institutions in global governance issues and transnational 
regulatory frameworks.53 
50 Id.  
51 Saskia Sassen, Embedding the Global in the National in SMITH, SOLINGER, AND TOPIK, EDS, STATES AND 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1999), at 111. 
52 Id., at 109. 
53 See, for example, Thomas J. Biersteker, Rodney Bruce Hall and Craig N. Murphy, eds, Private Authority and 
Global Governance (forthcoming); Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity (Columbia 1999); Special 
Issue on The Internet and Sovereignty, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423 (1999); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, ED,
CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Oxford 
1998). 
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One of the most important manifestation of the increase in power of non-State actors and 
corresponding decrease in statal power is the international capital market.54 Although figures 
vary, there is an estimated daily trade of over a trillion US dollars.55 The volume of its annual 
trade is estimated to be ten [10] times the whole world’s GNP.56 The market was deregulated 
in the 1960’s creating ‘stateless capital’,57 which ‘rushe[s] in and out of national financial 
markets without any political regulation and unhinged for long periods from underlying 
fundamentals of the real economy.’58 This market is unregulated by any Nation-State, though 
multilateral institutions play an increasingly important role that even overshadows the 
legislative and regulatory efforts of Nation-State governments. Both Cohen and Strange 
provide a valuable analysis of the growing disjunction between the functional domain of 
economic activity and territorial reach of the sovereign; from this persuasive premise, they 
reach the conclusion that sovereignty is subject to a process of gradual erosion, or to use 
Strange’s phrase, the “diffusion of authority from state to market.”59 Emerging forms of  
“complex sovereignty” break down the internal structural coherence of the State, replacing it 
with often autonomous regulatory agencies whose purpose is to meditate between the 
international and the local or national.60 
Another manifestation of the power and influence of non-State actors in the globalisation of 
markets and the global economy is that Nation-States (especially in the Third World) are 
increasingly ‘held to ransom’ by multinational corporations. Close relationships between 
governments and multinational corporations give rise to profits for both the corporations and 
 
54 The market has been dubbed the ”global casino”.
55 The figure is approximately 1.3 trillion US dollars, estimated in June 1995. The US stock market by 
comparison has less than ten [10] billion US dollars a day. H Henderson & AF Kay, ‘Introducing Currency 
Competition to the Global Currency Markets’, (1996) Vol. 28, No.4, Futures, pp. 306-307. 
56 Emphasis ours. Id. p. 306. 
57 The effect of deregulation has been described as ‘piracy’. S. SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME, 92 (1995). 
58 Id. p. 437. 
59 Strange, supra  note 49 at 197. 
60 Jayasuriya, supra  note 45, at 425. 
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governments, but also importantly, the corporations exercise a great deal of influence over 
governmental policy.61 Nation-States when determining domestic policies, can ignore them 
but they face the risk of losing foreign capital, foreign investment and foreign technology, all 
of which could have a dramatic impact on that Nation-State’s economy.  
 
Technology by removing the importance of national borders in commerce has had the effect 
that constituent units or regions of a Nation-State now are no longer dependent on their 
national governments for trade. In a very interesting work, Kenichi Ohmae believes that the 
Nation-State will be replaced by ‘regional economies’, communities unified by economic 
reasons rather than political or cultural.62 He describes them as ‘natural business units in 
today’s global economy’ that either have or desire direct access to the global market and do 
not rely upon their respective national/central governments for economic assistance and in 
fact wish to be free from their controls as well.63 His basic hypothesis is that national 
sovereignty has been effectively weakened by the level of economic interdependence and also 
by the opportunities which are made available by the global economy; Nation-States are no 
longer the efficient ‘middle-man’.64 The cause for the decline of the Nation-States’ control 
over their economies is due mainly to their inabilities to respond to new challenges such as 
technology, which enables vast sums of capital to be transferred instantaneously and access to 
information which has created increasingly universal consumer preferences (the author 
describes this as the ‘Californiaisation’ of preferences); changes in industry dynamics and 
 
61 See Frank B. Rampersad, Coping with Globalisation: A Suggested Policy Package for Small Countries, 570 
ANNALS 115, 116-118 (2000). 
62 KENICHI OHMAE THE END OF THE NATION-STATES, THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES, supra note31.. 
Examples can be found in his Chapter 7. One such example is the region containing Menden (Indonesia), Penang 
( Malaysia), Phuket (Thailand). Although from the examples given they will share some if not many similarities 
particularly in their approach to economics and their desires for lifestyles of their citizens. In many respects 
Ohmae’s regional states are very similar to Khan’s ‘free states’.  See KHAN, L.A., THE EXTINCTION OF NATION-
STATES, A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS, (1995) .   
63 OHMAE, THE END OF NATION-STATES, THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES, supra, note 31, at 5.  
64 Id. p. 4;  
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business attitudes. Also that Nation-States are burdened by outdated policies such as 
maintaining the civil minimum;65 subsidies for the national interest; and protectionist tariffs.66 
In seeking to circumvent the ‘inefficiency’ of the Nation-State in a bid to balance the many 
common as well as competing interests of a global economy, global forces have generated an 
“. . . expanding web of transnational regulatory institutions. . .,” and other multilateral 
institutions, with the result that commercial activity continues to move farther away from the 
Nation-State government.67 This move is reflected in the growth in power and authority of 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the EU, and with 
their expanding declarations, conventions, and international legal instruments. Thus, Nation-
States are faced with transnational commercial practices and the regulatory institutions, which 
globalisation engenders. These multilateral institutions provide substitutes (albeit imperfect) 
for the functions of global markets without global governance.’68 However, this leaves open 
the question and concern for small, lower-income countries with only limited abilities to 
comprehensively protect themselves.  
 
The general uneasiness by weak Nation-States over the predatory tendencies of multinational 
corporations is almost matched by their distaste for the increasing entrenchment of strict 
conditionalities and mandatory appraisals imposed by multilateral institutions Such as  the 
IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors. A key 
 
65 The Civil Minimum refers to the political necessity for subsidising often unnecessary as well as unprofitable 
development in areas that are considered marginal or economically repressed such as roads and bridges in 
Hokkaido, Japan, or to insure equality of infrastructure throughout the nation-state. See the author’s Chapter 4 
for further detail, Id. at 41-59. 
66 Id. at 59-71 and 79 for a summary. See the author’s  Chapter 5 also. 
67 Louis Henkin, Symposium, Keynote Address: The Global Market as Friend or Foe of Human Rights: The 
Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1999). 
68 Petito, supra note 42, at 1149. See Leslie A. Burton, Toward an International Bankruptcy Policy in Europe: 
Four Decades in Search of a Treaty, 5 ANN. SURV. INT.’L & COMP. L. 205 at n. 63-64 (1999). See generally 
Louis Henkin, supra note 117: “In an era of globalization, basic institutional structures that shape our daily 
interactions transcend national boundaries.” Id. 
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example reflecting the authority of multilateral institutions in the global economy and the 
significant leak of economic power from State to non-State actors is reflected in the role of 
the IMF and the World Bank in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis. Under the arrangement of 
global governance reflected in conditional aid by these two Bretton Woods institutions, the 
economic policies of the Nation-State are mediated by the dictates of these institutions. The 
Article now turns to consider this in the next section. 
 
4.1.1. The IMF & The World Bank: Economic Dictatorship? 
Conditionality, defined as “the linking of the disbursement of a loan to understandings 
concerning the economic policy which the government of the borrower country intends to 
pursue,”69 now forms a cornerstone in both the IMF and the World Bank’s financing 
programmes. These conditions enable the IMF and the World Bank “independently to 
examine the country’s need for balance of payments assistance and to require the adoption of 
corrective policies before funds are disbursed.”70 Common conditions imposed by both 
institutions include restrictions on the credit provided by domestic banks, decreasing the fiscal 
deficit, depreciation of the exchange rate, and trade liberalisation measures.71 The World 
Bank’s conditionality practice often exceeds the macroeconomic corrections prescribed by the 
IMF as its lending has “evolved ... [in]to detailed reforms affecting the public administration 
itself”72 that often affect governance issues.  
 
69 PAUL MOSELY, A THEORY OF CONDITIONALITY, IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND POLICY REFORM 
129, (Paul Mosely, ed., 1992). 
70 See Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National 
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’..L. L. 161 166 (1998). Although the 
author is referring specifically to the IMF, this is an apt description of the Bank’s conditionality practices as 
well. 
71 See Lance Taylor, IMF Conditionality: Incomplete Theory, Policy Malpractice, in THE POLITICAL MORALITY 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 33, 34 (Robert J. Myers ed., 1987). Although IMF conditions are not 
published, “they do tend to become public knowledge indirectly through governments, commercial banks and 
the media.” Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 
38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 452, (1997).   
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The Asian “tigers” experienced the phenomenon of loss of control over the national economy 
first-hand. Three ugly features of the globalised economy were reflected in the Crisis. First, 
the threat posed by international capital markets in effectively devaluing a Nation-State’s 
currency; secondly the horrendous effects on the domestic economies and policies of the 
Nation-State and lastly, the intrusiveness of multilateral institutions on the Nation-State’s 
economic aristocracy through dictation of monetary and fiscal policies. What began as a 
simple recession in Thailand turned into one of the worst global economic disasters in 
history.73 Nation-States watched helplessly as the contagion74 caused widespread panic and 
economic chaos in its wake. Like a row of dominoes, one by one, nations succumbed to the 
contagion. By the time the worldwide crisis concluded, the currencies of such disparate 
nations as Canada, Chile, and Australia had plummeted.75 
Reflecting on the Asian Crisis, Tsai observes that: 
 
The experiences during the Asian Financial Crisis exemplify how globalisation has 
weakened national sovereignty and a state’s ability to defend itself against 
deleterious events by foreign actors. Globalisation, particularly the speed of capital 
movement and near-instantaneous communication, made nearly every country 
susceptible to the contagion. States’ defensive sovereignty is threatened because they 
can no longer shield themselves from the effects of events occurring outside of their 
territory.76 
72 IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 59 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra 
eds., 1991). 
73 For a brief and concise account of how the crisis unfolded, see Mary C. Tsai, Globalization And 
Conditionality: Two Sides Of The Sovereignty Coin 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1317,1322-1328 (2000). 
74 The contagion was caused by a combination of investors and banks withdrawing their capital from these 
nations. For example, Brazil, for a time, lost foreign reserves at a rate of $1 billion per day. See NICHOLAS D. 
KRISTOF with SHERYL WuDUNN, "The World's Ills May Be Obvious, but Their Cure Is Not," New York 
Times, February 18, 1999at A9. Furthermore, weak banks in one country called in loans from other countries, 
leaving economic disaster in their wake. See Steven Pearlstein, Understanding the Asian Economic Crisis, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at A32. 
75 See David D. Hale, The IMF, Now More than Ever: The Case for Financial Peacekeeping, FOREIGN AFF., 
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 8. 
76 TSAI, supra note 73, at 1322-1323. 
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The Asian crisis and its effects created a situation for IMF and the World Bank’s 
involvement.77 The Bretton Woods institutions believed that the conditions they placed on 
lending would prevent a recurrence of the crisis.78 The two institutions sought to bolster 
nations’ ability to withstand any future crises caused by globalisation and attempted to 
strengthen nations’ defensive sovereignty by imposing conditions on recipient nations. 
However, conditionality handicaps the debtor nations’ ability to develop their own solutions 
to economic disasters, thereby infringing on their affirmative sovereignty. Thus, the 
conditionality requirements imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions further exacerbated 
the effects of globalisation on state sovereignty. At a minimum, conditionality limits the range 
of economic policies at a debtor nations’ disposal, while, at the extreme, it forces unwilling 
sovereign nations to undergo shock therapy. Effectively, with the imposition of IMF or World 
Bank conditions, sovereign debtor nations are forced to abandon their chosen and preferred 
course of economic development and to accept the vision of economic development that the 
IMF and the World Bank impose. Global economic integration alone introduced new 
challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty; however, when coupled with the Bretton 
Woods conditionality, sovereignty is in a more precarious position than ever before.’79 
4.2. Regulatory Regimes and Fragmentation of the State 
In both spheres of politics and economics, it is apparent that globalisation is replacing the 
sovereign State, and it clear that States are unable to control their own economies and 
territories in the same way that was possible in the era of raison d’etat. This phenomenon is 
accurately reflected in Camilleri and Falk’s view that “global processes and institutions are 
invading the Nation-State and as a consequence dismantling the conceptual and territorial 
 
77 See John W. Head, Global implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: Banking, Economic Integration, and 
Crisis Management in the New Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. at 939-940, 945 (1999).  
78 See Stanley Fischer, In Defense of the IMF, FOREIGN AFF ,July-Aug. 1998, at 106. 
79 TSAI, supra note 73, at 1328-1329. 
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boundaries that have traditionally sustained the theory and practice of state sovereignty.”80 
“Transnational civil society” has its own agendas which do not necessarily accord with 
governmental agendas, but which it nonetheless pursues.81 
States are being “invaded” by “global processes”—and stating that the more penetrated an 
economy becomes, the more State sovereignty is undermined is not too far-fetched an 
observation. One of the central aspects of the “strong” globalisation thesis is the argument 
that States are no longer autonomous actors; they now find themselves embedded in a web of 
institutions and regimes. Power seems to be leaking from States to non-state actors. As 
Jayasuriya observes, “[o]ne of the ramifications of State fragmentation and the greater 
permeability of the boundary between domestic and international domains is the emergence of 
a polycentric legal order that directly contradicts the “monistic” legal order implied by an 
internally unified State.”82 
An example of the fragmentation or disaggregation of the State is the development of 
independent central banks. Central banks are national institutions, concerned with national 
matters. Yet over the last two decades or so, ‘they have become the institutional home within 
the Nation-State for monetary policies that are necessary to further the development of a 
global capital market and, indeed, more generally, a global economic system.’83 ‘The new 
conditionality of the global economic system--e.g. the conditions that need to be met in order 
for a country to become integrated into the global capital market--contains as one key element 
the autonomy of central banks so that they may institute a certain kind of monetary policy.’84 
80 JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND 
FRAGMENTING GLOBE 98 (1992). 
81 This has become a catch-all term to include the various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as aid 
agencies, political networks, and so on. See Holton, supra note 130 at 35. 
82 JAYASURIYA, supra note 45, at 441. 
83 SASSEN, supra note 51, at 113. 
84 Id., at 112. 
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Sovereignty is reconfigured in the sense that it is no longer exercised within a monistic legal 
and decision-making structure;85 instead, it is parceled and diffused across a range of 
governmental and non-governmental authorities. Governance programs seek to build and 
make transparent a whole range of regulatory institutions; but, in so doing, it is necessary first 
to make these institutions more independent from central State apparatus, thereby constituting 
islands of sovereignty within the State. As a process (though it does have a different 
normative basis), this has some affinity with the multilevel governance of the European 
polity.86 
One of the important features of governance mechanisms in the global economy is the 
emergence of a system of regulatory networks.87 As the State becomes fragmented, regulatory 
agencies increasingly develop international connections with other regulatory agencies, 
thereby taking on an “international” function.88 This reconstitution of sovereignty in a world 
of rapid globalisation takes the “internal” form of fragmentation and polycentricity and the 
“external” form of “network governance.” In fact, regulatory systems have become 
increasingly important in the management of the global economy and pose important 
challenges to our conception of the way international law is formulated and enforced; these 
regulatory webs do not depend on formal international treaties or rely on international 
organisations for their enforcement. In short, the emergence of an international regulatory 
State depends on and requires the active participation of agencies within the State.89 Again, 
 
85 For an exploration of these issues, see Christian Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and 
the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration, 2 EUR. L.J. 105, 106-35 (1996) 
86 Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Political Rationalities of Regionalism: APEC and the EU in 
Comparative Perspective, 11 PAC. REV. 311, 314-315 (1998). 
87 JAYASURIYA, supra note 45 at 446. 
88 Id., at 447. 
89 Id. 
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the importance of the reconstitution of sovereignty in these new systems of global regulation 
should be recognised. We can term this a form of “network governance.”90 
There are two significant features which stand out. First, regulatory cooperation was driven 
by the desire to protect sovereignty. Second, this cooperation could only be achieved by 
internationalising regulatory agencies, thereby rupturing the internal sovereignty of the State. 
Arguably, the emphasis placed on the role of the State as a regulator--which multilateral 
agencies seem to have recognised--requires not a reduction in the role of the State, but rather a 
restructuring of its governmental functions, shifting the “boundary between the public and 
private sectors, thereby enlarging the latter, with the government’s role changing from direct 
provision to regulation.” 
 
Global processes come about in national territories, leading to a “. . . need for 
deregulation and the formation of regimes that facilitate the free circulation of 
capital, goods, information and services,” which in part denationalises a Nation-State 
and in part shifts elements of State sovereignty to other institutions.91 As colonisation 
brought sovereign legal systems and commercial codes to harmonise economics, 
globalisation has to do the same and more. Though globalisation has not forced such 
a severe “. . . convergence of domestic policies and institutions,” it still brings much 
greater integration.92 The suggestion is that this greater integration “. . . breeds 
friction and conflict rather than accord and harmony [.]”93 
4.2.1. The WTO: Rule-Based International Framework 
One of the most important international economic regulatory regimes is the WTO. The 
purpose of the WTO is to provide a rule-based legal framework to resolve international trade 
disputes. Four characteristics give the WTO a base for strong influence and authority of the 
international market place, an influence which few States can match. Firstly it is a permanent 
 
90 Id. 
91 See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 98 (1996). at xii. “Other 
institutions” range from supranational entities to the global capital market. 
92 See Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, Globalization and the Inequality of Nations, 5098 NAT’L BUR.
ECON. RES. (April 1995); 
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organisation with its own Secretariat and administrative infrastructure.94 Secondly, its 
jurisdiction is wide and in many areas covers spheres that were traditionally within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Nation-States.95 Thirdly, there is a sense of certainty and uniformity 
concerning the application of the agreements of the WTO; the set of agreements apply equally 
to each member; and the laws and policies of each member must conform with their 
obligations under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.96 
Finally it will administer a Trade Policy Review Mechanism which is designed to monitor 
domestic trade policies and encourage cooperation between members. In order to promote 
‘global economic policy-making’ the WTO will also cooperate with the IMF and World 
Bank.97 
It has been stated that the WTO is not intended to encroach on national sovereignty: 
 
The WTO is in no way an assault on any country’s sovereignty. If anything it 
enhances it by providing a more effective dispute settlement mechanism through 
which countries can ensure that their rights are respected and by providing a 
permanent forum for adopting the international trade policy agenda to the real needs 
of nations.98 
Similar to arguments provided by the “realists” for the European Union, the WTO strengthens 
national sovereignty by collective action, but also by maintaining the equality of Nation-
States by restricting their external sovereignty under a centralised legal structure. However, in 
order to be more effective, the WTO by implementing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
[TPRM], goes one step further and becomes involved in the domestic policy making powers 
of Nation-States, their domestic jurisdiction. The purpose of the TPRM is to increase 
 
93 Id.  
94 Id., at 599. 
95 Id. Some examples of the areas are agriculture, textile, clothing and services.  
96 Susan Hainsworth, Sovereignty, Economic Integration, and the World Trade Organisation, 33 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 599, 583, [1995]. 
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understanding of the trade policies of the members by greater transparency using peer review. 
This is done through “consultations” between the Trade Policy Review Board meeting with 
members being reviewed with a report being published.99 Therefore the TRPM provides the 
WTO with the potential to erode national sovereignty:  
 
..although national sovereignty is apparently maintained intact in the TPRM, there is a 
tacit acknowledgment that transparency and exposure of non-compliance is an initial 
step towards facilitating policy harmonisation .. The TPRM may not represent a 
pooling of state sovereignty,...it does however, represent a pool for “mirroring” state 
sovereignty in relation to international trade consensus.100 
The WTO by this trade consensus raises the concern that individual trading corporations will 
need to refer to the WTO rather than their own national government to assist with their own 
planning and policy decisions: 
 
Questions of where sovereignty actually resides and where it should be allocated for 
the most efficient and effective regulation of transnational economic activity (ie. at the 
sub-state, regional, state or supranational level) will become ever more salient.101 
This phenomenon is already occurring with nearly every constituent state of the USA having 
official standing with the WTO and maintaining ‘trade offices’ in other Nation-States. This 
trend increases economic interdependence and weakens the influence of national 
governments. Thus the WTO is a potential replacement for Nation-States. It assists regional 
economies to maximise their wealth and adds a degree of protection by regulating their trade, 
something Nation-States are increasingly unable to do.  
 
97 Id., at 598-9. 
98 Former GATT/WTO Director-General Peter Sutherland as cited in Id.,at 621. 
99 Id., at 606-611. 
100 Id. ,at 609. 
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V. Is the End of the Nation-State Nigh? 
Globalisation is not the only threat to the Nation-State and sovereignty. The Westphalian 
system faces environmental disasters, illegal migration and mass exodus of refugees, wars, 
non-national terrorist organizations with potential access to biological weapons, and of course 
nation-state controlled nuclear weapons. Such threats are beyond the ability of even the most 
powerful nation-state to face alone, and instead require the cooperation of nation-states.102 
(Even then there is the possibility of the so-called “rogue state”.) Further, technology has 
made it possible for economic entities, such as MNC’s to treat the entire globe as one 
“internal market” which has severely reduced Nation-States’ financial ability to solve these 
problems.103 So it is easy to understand why some commentators have predicted the end of 
the Nation-State.104 
However, one author believes that globalisation really signals the end of the present structure 
of the international community, rather than an end to the Nation-State.105 Instead the author 
sees the nation-state surviving to become an intermediary between regional entities (“super-
states”) such as the EU, and NGO’s.  
 
However, it will always remain the function of the state to transport values from the 
domestic order to the supra-national and international legal orders, as well as to be 
open to input from the international orders to the domestic scene.106 
The importance of NGO’s, such as the World Bank and the WTO, in the international 
community is well-documented above. The significance of these NGOs as well as MNCs as 
 
101 Id.,at 621-622. 
102 Stephan Hobe ‘The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law’ 40  DUQ L. REV ,655, at p. 656 
103 ‘Globalisation seems to be typified by new phenomena that transcend the control capacity of the modem 
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104 For example, KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION-STATES, THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES,,
supra note 32 & KHAN, supra note 62.
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major players in the international arena is further manifested by their representation and 
attendance at major government summits whether regional or international. In addition, they 
are affected indirectly and sometimes directly by norms of public international law whether it 
be in terms of their operations or interaction with other entities. A sore point though is that 
despite being a affected by norms of public international law, these entities do not have 
recognised international legal personality. 107 Such a denial has important disadvantages for 
international organizations, since it denies these entities “relevance” and the ability to directly 
participate in the development of international law108 Concomitantly, it has important 
advantages for Nation-States, the prime fountain of international law norms by giving them an 
upper hand in setting the agenda or at the very least influencing it. 
 
The denial of NGOs and MNCs of a direct role in contributing to the norms of the 
international system cannot last forever. In the Reparations Case the ICJ stated that ‘the 
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent 
of their rights’ and affirmed that the UN did have standing to bring an action before the ICJ in 
order to enforce its rights.109 There have also been consistent calls for international 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation to be granted international legal 
personality.110 Nation-States have however stood firm against de jure grants of international 
legal personality to entities other than states aiming to protect the statist driven international 
system by limiting the rights of participation and contribution of non-state entities. However, 
 
107 Id, at p. 659. 
108 Id.
109 Reparations Case [1949] ICJ Rep . 178. 
110 See for example the series of articles in AS. MULLER ET AL (ED.’S) THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
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this state of affairs has developed significant cracks. Certain NGOs have developed de facto 
vestiges of  international legal personality. The fight against the influence of MNC’s and 
NGO’s is a fight that nation-states will finally lose. Concessions that are granted from time to 
time based on “pragmatism” will eventually become cemented in practice and cross from their 
shadowy grey-area habitat as implicit rules of expedience into a black-white habitat as explicit 
rules of operation and interaction. Indeed if Nation-States are to survive this onslaught then 
they need to adapt, to bend before the wind, and the first step would be to acknowledge the 
international legal personality of non-nation-state actors in the international legal system.111 
Another way for nation-states to survive is through the formation of regional trading entities 
such as the EU. This is Kenichi Ohmae’s work; he believes that the nation-state will be 
replaced by ‘regional economies”, communities unified by economic reasons rather than 
political or cultural.112 This phenomenon has already begun in Europe with the development 
of “super-regions”.113 For example, Padania in Northern Italy; 114 and in France the Rhone-
Alpes area, with Lyons its capital, the so-called ‘Alpine Diamond’ which by-passes Paris and 
has virtually an independent commercial policy.115 Other regional areas are developing their 
own state-like bureaucracies and developing their own infrastructures to access the global 
economy directly.116 By shifting the physical border to its furthest extent, the EU overcomes 
this problem, by simply engulfing these smaller economic regions into one physical entity 
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controlled by one super central government in Brussels.  As national governments’ policies 
become increasingly subservient to regional economic controls or legislative bodies, then this 
creates the opportunity for ethnic groups, ‘peoples’, to refer not to the national governments 
that once united them, but to regional governments, thus accelerating the decline of the 
importance of national sovereignty.  
 
Ohmae concludes: - 
 
In today’s borderless world, the lesson for central government is clear: hold onto 
economic control too long, and it becomes worthless. Burdens increase, and no one 
will pay for them but you. Give it up early, however, or better, transmute it into one or 
another form of catalysis, and the global economy will rush in to help.117 
In other words nation-states will become nothing more than service providers, some sort of 
technology guardians, maintaining and supplying the necessary infrastructure to enable these 
areas continued access to the global economy. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the process of globalisation has transformed the traditional 
understandings of sovereignty and its embranglement with specific and exclusive jurisdiction 
over a given territorial area. The erosion of the internal sovereignty of the State is perhaps the 
first noticeable manifestation of the transformation of sovereignty. This is particularly the 
case because a key feature of the Westphalian model (and critical to the separation of the 
public and private in capitalism) is the internal unity of the State, which in turn implies a 
monistic legal order. Externally these changes in the form of sovereignty have been evident in 
 
117 Ohmae, THE END OF NATION-STATES, THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES supra  note 32,  at p. 140. 
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the emergence of global governance standards and regulatory regimes all of which are 
governed by a network of multilateral institutions.118 
The State still continues to dominate international political interaction but in modes and forms 
that are shaped by global forces. State sovereignty, is in the process of a significant 
transformation, at least among States that wish to reap the benefits a global marketplace can 
provide.119 The emergent, often imposed, consensus in the community of states to further 
globalisation has created a set of specific obligations on participating States. The State 
remains as the ultimate guarantor of the “rights” of global capital, in other words, the 
protection of contracts and property rights. Thus the State has incorporated the global project 
of its own shrinking role in regulating economic transactions.120 Firms operating 
transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national 
realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts. 121 
Globalisation has resulted in a significant reconfiguration of national sovereignty. Though 
sovereignty still manifests the highest or the supreme authority within a political community, 
it has lost its all encompassing nature especially in the economic sphere as governments have 
increasingly been sidelined as the ultimate monetary and fiscal policy makers.122 As 
technology continues to advance and fuel globalisation, the nation-state finds itself caught in 
the eye of a storm, it can either seek to put in place laws to facilitate an effective harnessing of 
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the benefits or it can choose to participate directly as a player, but with the critical 
disadvantages discussed above. Globalisation is not inhibited by political borders while 
technology renders geographic distance to be less relevant. The Nation-State is not only 
losing its many multi-faceted tentacles, but it is forced to participate in the very process that is 
responsible. So long as wealth or ownership of wealth can be transferred electronically, then 
globalisation will continue to be the driving force behind the threat to Westphalian 
sovereignty. However in a resource-strapped and overpopulated world of the future, the need 
to protect scare and valuable resources such as water will require that a sovereign’s authority 
be expressed territorially: it will not be enough that the owner is a corporation or an individual 
is located on another continent to ensure such protection, the sovereign’s presence in the form 
of an armed guard will be required. Such dominance will in all likelihood spur a cycle of 
military escalation and conflict. In such an environment, Nation-States and their centuries old 
alibi of sovereignty expressed as protection of national interest may return simply because of 
their proven superior martial organisation.123 
123 Porter, supra note 12, at p. 64. 
